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The return of nature?
Abstract

Published under the auspices of the journal Theory, Culture & Society, Inhuman Nature is one of the most
interesting monographs I have encountered in many years. The questions it raises and the answers it provides
are not only relevant to all of human geography's sub-fields (including cultural geography) but to physical
geography's component branches as well. This said, Nigel Clark's academic training lies outside geography,
and his book's back-cover endorsements come from two sociologists (Myra Hird and Adrian Franklin). But
it's not too hard to make direct connections between his plenary analysis of Anglophone social science, the
humanities and the Earth sciences, and the way in which Anglophone geographers think about, interrogate
and de/politicize 'nature'. Clark's book could, as Franklin justifiably opines, '[be] one of the most important
[monographs] ... you're ever likely to read'. I will summarize the claims and contentions of Inhuman Nature
before identifying its principal implications for research, teaching and 'outreach' activities in contemporary
geography. For those willing to be persuaded, these implications are very significant analytically, normatively
and practically. However, that willingness presumes readers will find clever ways of tackling - or downplaying some very significant problems with Nigel Clark's arguments (as I'll explain towards the end).
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The return of nature?
Inhuman nature: sociable life on a dynamic planet. By Nigel Clark. London: Sage.
2011. 267 pp. £63.00 cloth. ISBN 9 7807 6195 7256

Published under the auspices of the journal Theory, Culture & Society, Inhuman
nature is one of the most interesting monographs I have encountered in many years.
The questions it raises and the answers it provides are not only relevant to all of
human geography’s sub-fields (including cultural geography) but to physical
geography’s component branches as well. This said, Nigel Clark’s academic training
lies outside geography, and his book’s back-cover endorsements come from two
sociologists (Myra Hird and Adrian Franklin). But it’s not too hard to make direct
connections between his plenary analysis of Anglophone social science, the
humanities and the earth sciences, and the way in which Anglophone geographers
think about, interrogate and de/politicise ‘nature’. Clark’s book could, as Franklin
justifiably opines, “[be] one of the most important [monographs] … you’re ever likely
to read”. I will summarise the claims and contentions of Inhuman nature before
identifying its principal implications for research, teaching and ‘outreach’ activities
in contemporary geography. For those willing to be persuaded, these implications are
very significant analytically, normatively and practically. However, that willingness
presumes readers will find clever ways of tackling – or downplaying – some very
significant problems with Nigel Clark’s arguments (as I’ll explain towards the end).
Inhuman nature has grand ambitions. It seeks to understand the relations
between homo sapiens and a biophysical world of land, air and water that’s evolved
over millions of years. It also spells-out the implications of a ‘proper’ understanding
of these relations. “This book”, Clark writes,
is about coming to terms with a planet that constantly rumbles, folds, cracks, erupts,
irrupts. It’s about living with earth … processes that have gone on long before our
species made its appearance … It explores some of the issues that arise out of the
condition of being sensuous, sociable beings in a universe that nourishes and
supports us, but is forever capable of withdrawing this sustaining presence. And it …
ask[s] how better we might live – with other things and … each other – in the
context of a deep, elemental underpinning that is at once a source of profound
insecurity (p. xiv).

Clark takes very seriously modern humanity’s remarkable ability to modify natural
environments to suit its own diverse purposes. But he takes equally seriously the
earth’s enduring capacity to hinder and harm us. “[M]ost of material reality is not
ours’ to make over”, he reminds us (p. xx) – a point which is blindingly obvious and
yet, paradoxically, well worth making. For Clark, the idea of the ‘Anthropocene’ –
which describes a new era in which earth surface processes and forms will change
significantly because of anthropogenic forcings – gives far too much credit to global
humanity. In his view not only will these forcings merely amplify potentialities
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inherent in the processes; what’s more, the earth will continue to throw major
challenges our way, regardless of anthropogenic environmental change – more
earthquakes, more tsunamis, and more volcanoes. Our ‘risk society’ is thus not
entirely of our own making: according to Clark it’s partly a product of those
elemental forces that make our planet as volatile today as it has been for countless
previous generations.
Throughout Inhuman nature Clark’s watchwords are ‘asymmetry’ and
‘indifference’. The first refers to the balance of power in the nexus of humanenvironment relations. Clark consistently highlights the earth’s capacity to exceed
our most elaborate designs and our greatest works of social and physical engineering.
For him, the well-known idea of the human ‘domination of nature’ massively
overstates the case. The second term reminds us that the planet is not designed for
our comfort or well-being, even though homo sapiens is, as Darwin famously
showed, a child of the earth rather than a deity. “What are catastrophes for soft,
fleshy creatures like us”, Clark observes at one point, “are for the earth merely minor
and mundane readjustments” (p. 23). In a chapter focussed on Kant’s philosophy,
Clark argues that European thinking since the Enlightenment period has been
characterised by a failure to properly reckon with nature’s power and the moral
implications of its indifference towards us. Kant, Clark argues, was not alone in
reacting to the disastrous Lisbon earthquake of 1755 by instituting distinctions
between nature and humanity, compulsion and freedom. His (normative) idea of the
modern subject accented self-determination in both mind and body: it focussed
attention on humans as the ultimate makers of imaginative worlds and licensed the
creation of “… a natural order made over so thoroughly by the collectivity of selfwilled agents that it would cease to pose a palpable threat to human existence” (p.
95). Because of this, only humanly created disasters – think of Auschwitz or
Hiroshima – have been seen to necessitate deep reflection on ethical norms, habits
and goals. True, the ‘environmental crisis’ has inspired much soul searching about
our treatment of the non-human world since the mid-1960s. But, according to Clark,
its hasn’t departed from the Kantian template: aside from (say) deep ecologists and
committed animal rights activists, most environmental ethics involves assigning
value to the non-human other as a matter of choice. In short, Clark maintains that
the Western worldview is profoundly anthropocentric and dualistic: it has, literally,
lost touch with the earth beneath and the sky above. 1
This matters for us – for how we understand and relate to each other – as
much as for that ‘nature’ we try to shut-out, manage, control or even (sometimes)
‘respect’ and ‘value’. In three chapters on global ‘climate justice’, Hurricane Katrina
and humans and fire respectively Clark explains why. As international carbon trading
and the 2006 Stern Review illustrate, “it is the tight coupling of the imperative to
avoid catastrophe while appearing to pursue justice and equity that is pushing
climate change policy in the direction of generalizable units of [substance and] value”
(p. 113). Measuring earth processes – notably greenhouse gas emissions and sinks –
is, via monetary metrics, being hard-wired to normative issues of fairness (realised
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through ‘compensatory’ measures that move resources towards the Global South).
This is a particular way of connecting ‘facts’ and ‘values’, one that presumes the
object-subject dualism favoured by Königsberg’s famous philosopher.
However, as Clark argues, it will be nigh impossible to ‘measure’ harm and
institute ‘compensation’ if future earth systems cross thresholds and behave
erratically. In these circumstances, our present-day calculative reasoning practices
will come-up seriously short. We need, Clark argues, to consider a less procedural
and more generous sense of ‘just’ action towards others. Recent catastrophes –
modern day Lisbon earthquakes – may be harbingers. In Clark’s view they can
challenge the Kantian insistence that moral judgement and ethical action are sui
generis – things that, while they may be inspired by natural events, are constitutively
independent of them when all is said and done. Consider Hurricane Katrina – which,
let us recall, disabled a very large city-region in a wealthy, highly technologised
country. It inspired everyday acts of kindness and assistance towards those afflicted
that were not ‘measured’ and which occurred in the absence of properly functioning
disaster management systems. Katrina was a crisis at once local (New Orleans and its
hinterland) and national (it affected the whole USA) that, fleetingly, produced what
Clark calls ‘estrangement’.
This is a key idea in Inhuman nature. It describes losing any established sense
of oneself or the other, such is the force of natural extremes like tsunamis or major
earthquakes. Estrangement can, Clark suggests, foster new senses of community
near and far:
The surrender to the demands of others is an incitement to purposive action … It is
our inability to truly know and share the ‘estrangement’ of the other that spurs us
to think and act. (p. 72)
… if generosity is truly an opening of oneself, then it … makes the one who gives
vulnerable. The donor too must be prepared to feel hurt, to be chastened,
criticized, even rejected. Only in this way might they – we – learn to give more
responsibly, as well as responsiblyresponsively. (p. 79)

We can, Clark continues, surrender to the past – not only our contemporaries – and
should consider the generosity of our forebears too. His chapter on pre-industrial,
pre-capitalist uses of fire (in Australia and elsewhere) explores the inestimable gift
given to modern humanity of how to work with (and around) the volatile power of
combustion. Building on this, a closing chapter entitled ‘Extending hospitality’
proposes a cosmopolitan ethos that is deeply temporal and geographical. It’s
predicated on a profound sense of our ‘horizontal’ and ‘temporal’ locatedness: each of
us occupies a point in space-time that is utterly indissociable from the lives of
unknown others past, present and future. On this basis Clark advocates for a
tolerant, giving, and caring ethic that transcends current human divisions and
expands our temporal horizons far into the future. To cite his closing words, whose
eloquence typifies much of the book’s prose,
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A million and one obscure acts of love flare and fade away … tiny sparks of
generosity that arc across the cracks which will not cease to open up in the earth.
Improbably, we have made it this far, across unfathomable ruptures and through
innumerable thresholds. Improbably, we may make it over the next tipping point.
(p. 219)

I’ll offer some summary judgements about Inhuman nature shortly, but first
let me consider its implications for geographers – and not only those who profess an
interest in human-environment relations. Clark’s book makes no mention of the
discipline most readers of this journal call home, but its arguments hit home
nonetheless. Inhuman nature both identifies, and calls into question, a particular
‘culture of nature’ that its author believes dominates a number of social science
subjects. It suggests that many of us are Kant’s progeny, knowingly or not –
including those on the Left of academia who point to the social character of nature
or else aim to dissolve the nature-society dualism altogether. This is, perhaps,
obvious in writing that, through the 1990s, focussed on the ‘construction’ of ‘nature’
– with the latter term always in scare-quotes to denote the unnaturalness of its
referents. It is, Clark implies, equally obvious in ‘de-naturalising’ approaches to
investigating ‘natural hazards’ – approaches that, in Geography, can be traced back
to the 1970s writings of Ben Wisner, Ken Hewitt and Phil O’Keefe, among others.
But Clark’s more arresting claim is that even recent ‘symmetrical’ investigations into
how humans interact with the world – for example, those of Bruno Latour – fail to
reckon with the material force and ethical charge of nature (a term that, minus any
scare-quotes, Clark uses unapologetically throughout his book). 2
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In sum, despite the erstwhile differences between what Kate Soper 3 called
‘nature sceptical’ approaches and the ‘new materialisms’ of Latour and fellowtravellers, Clark believes they have much in common:
[If] …is the core premise of critical, radical or progressive social thought [is] …: the belief
that the realities we inhabit can and should be changed.2 p. 50 – but they’re right.

“Paradoxically … the outcome of [recently] affording more agency to
nonhumans has [paradoxically]have been a massive expansion of the dominions
of being upon which collective human agency imagines it has purchase. (” p. 50-
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51, emphasis added)

In contemporary human geography, this view raises questions about the
novelty and purchase of research inspired by Actor-Network Theory or that
which explores affect, the ‘non-representational’ and human embodiment. By
routinely focussing on micro-scale ‘encounters’ with the non-human does this
research screen-out those important meso- and macro-scale processes that
are not at all up for ‘re/negotiation’ (materially or ethically)? What do we, our
students and others with whom we speak lose by our seeming denial of those
intractable, often destructive, aspects of nature’s agency?
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This is an interesting question, and it speaks to the hoary subject of
whether a properly ‘human’ geography can proceed absent any deep or
sustained engagement with the procedures and findings of physical
geography. Despite the attractions of doing local level, case-based, dataintensive research (involving detailed field and laboratory work), many
physical geographers are deeply interested in regional, continental and global
scale events and processes. Bleeding as it does into the wider earth sciences,
it’s this kind of research that underpins much of Clark’s argument (along with
certain currents of European ‘biophilosophy’). 4 Who would have thought that
geoscience could inspire human geographers to ask the kind of Aristotlean
questions Clark poses: are we unreflectively reproducing dangerous habits of
thought and practice?; what sort of world is our research and teaching
actively trying to produce (or prevent from coming into being)?; even when
we think we’re ‘taking the debate forward’ are we unwittingly part of ‘the
problem’ rather than ‘the solution’? For me, the early chapters of Inhuman
nature caused some deep soul searching about my own professional modus
operandi. They challenge the conceit that it’s social science and humanities
scholars who have all the answers to these questions, while the scientists
simply tackle the Platonic questions (and who sometimes need reminding
that these questions secrete value judgements and ethical commitments of
their own). The interdisciplinary dialogue Clark has in mind looks nothing
like those presupposed in conventional discussions about the need for more
‘unity’ in Geography. By Clark’s lights, these discussions would appear far too
Kantian in cast. Something else is called for.
Since Clark’s book speaks to profound issues about the purpose and
quality of human existence it also obliges us to think about ourselves in the
round, not simply as ‘academics’. Despite their enduring interest in humanenvironment relations, geographers have played little or no part in shaping
public and political discussions about the ‘big environmental questions’ – at
least on the human side of Geography. In the early 1970s the nascent Left of
the discipline didn’t really ride the new wave of radical environmentalism.
More recently, only Jared Diamond (who has no background in geography
though he’s now in a Geography department) has visibly tackled the big
issues of global natural resource exhaustion. For all its manifest flaws,
Diamond’s public scholarship constitutes an attempt to step-off the usual
academic tram-lines. To be sure, Clark’s book remains resolutely scholastic,
but its arguments enjoin us to produce forms of knowledge that are avowedly
‘worldly’ and also unsettling. If you buy into the arguments of Inhuman
nature then their implications cannot be contained in the academic arena
alone – mere grist for the next seminar discussion. Rigorously pursued, the
answers to Clark’s nature-inspired Aristotlean questions break-down false
divisions between work and home, public and private. By reformatting our
own habits of thought and practice Clark asks us to help others do the same.
It might be timely to heed Clark’s plea for some serious self-reflection about
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all aspects of our lives, professional and personal. As things stand, a number
of earth and environmental scientists are saying far more radical things about
human-environment relationships than almost all human geographers 5. Most
of us haven’t yet taken seriously these scientists’ arguments in our own
research, teaching or private lives.
Having highlighted the provocations of Inhuman nature, let me close
with some critical comments. The force of Clark’s argument rests directly
upon the force nature is said to exert on us. However, momentous though
events like the 2010 Haiti earthquake manifestly are, the fact is they appear
not to shake our collective commitment to the Kantian settlement Clark
criticises. They strike us as aberrations and exceptions – at least ‘us’ in the
world’s richest countries. We see them as occasions for providing emergency
relief to needy others or implementing better disaster mitigation measures,
not the basis for a trial by ‘estrangement’. In large part, this is because those
aspects of ‘nature’ that we can control allow many of us to enjoy considerable
day-to-day stability (and high living standards). There’s a sense in Clark’s
book that nature will release a sort of primordial sensibility that’s been
contained for centuries, as if existing cultural norms and habits can be
broken-down by biophysical shocks and more ‘authentic’ ones created. But he
surely realises that this is utopian. If massive biophysical changes lie ahead of
us – as many climate scientists predict – what’s to stop us responding even
more forcefully than Kant did to the Lisbon earthquake?
These changes are also as likely to create suffering and conflict as
compassion and new forms of community. Clark accepts that Kant made a
choice, yet – contrary to this – implies that nature will make us see that
there’s really only ever been one option. Today, the choices made to continue
with business as usual – even in the face of biblical events like the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami – are, I’d argue, possible because of persistent wealth
asymmetries. The rich world dispenses aid and calculates ‘just compensation’
because it can; ordinary people make charitable donations to emergency
helplines because they live far from the (typically poorer) regions where most
extreme natural events occur. In light of this, Clark’s arguments – while
inspiring and moving – lack what Marx famously asked of critique: that it
identify real potentialities immanent in the object of the critic’s animus. If
Nigel Clark is ahead of his time, 21st century environmental change will (I
hope) prove his humane arguments to have been more than wishful thinking.
In the meantime, his readers can choose whether to help dig new cultural
ground for a more volatile world that might reset global humanity’s compass.
Noel Castree, Geography, School of Environment & Development, Manchester
University, M13 9PL noel.castree@man.ac.uk
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Endnotes
1Just

to absolutely clear here, Clark is not (i) predicting a future catastrophe that will erase much of

humankind (cf. Cormac McCarthy’s acclaimed novel The road [New York, Picador, 2006]), (ii)
advocating a return to pre-modern modes of existence, (iii) allying himself with nature-first ethicopolitical movements like Earth First!, (iv) opposed to high-technology, or (v) suggesting that there are
‘too many people’ on the planet, neo-Malthusian style.
2I

suggest something similar in N. Castree, ‘Geographies of nature in the making’, in S. Pile et al. eds,

A handbook of cultural geography (Sage, London, 2002), pp. 168-83.
3K.

Soper, What is nature? (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995).

4Clark

makes extensive use of certain works authored by Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, George

Bataille, Isabelle Stengers, and Emmanuel Levinas (among others).
5See,

for example, K. Anderson & A. Bows, Beyond ‘dangerous’ climate change: emission scenarios for

a new world’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 369 (2011), pp. 20-44; and J.
Rockstrom et al., ‘Planetary boundaries: exploring the safe operating space for humanity’, Ecology &
Society 14 (2009), pp. 1-21. Inevitably, there are exceptions to this rule. For instance, Clark’s
arguments are strongly echoed by the following: P. Harrison, ‘Corporeal remains: vulnerability,
proximity, and living on after the end of the world’, Environment and Planning A 40 (2008), pp. 423445. (2008); D. Lulka, ‘The residual humanism of hybridity’, Transactions of the Institute of British
Geographers 34 (2009), pp. 378-93; and N. Thrift ‘Donna Haraway’s dreams’, Theory, Culture &
Society 23 (2006), pp. 189-95. Meanwhile my sometime coeditor Bruce Braun has recently articulated
Clarkean arguments in several essays. I suspect many human geographers have shied away from
talking about powerful natural forces for fear of being seen as hard-core ‘environmentalists’
pronouncing the looming ‘ecological catastrophe’. The left of human geography also, I think, equates
talk of ‘environmental crisis’ with the spectre of ‘natural limits’ to human fulfilment – having taken
strong issue with ‘limits talk’ since David Harvey’s influential critique of neo-Malthusianism 40 years
ago 9in the pages of Economic Geography). However, as many in the worlds of literary fiction and the
visual arts are now showing us, there are many alternative ways to figure the future and to stimulate a
deep rethinking of our present day practices.
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